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RANKING, UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONANDWAGES
ABSTRACT
Firms often receive multiple acceptable applications for vacancies,
requiringa choice among candidates. This paper contrasts equilibria when
firms select workers at random and when firms select the worker with the
shortest spell of unemployment, called ranking. With the filling of vacancies
unaffected by the selection rule, both equilibria have the same aggregate
dynamics, but different distributions of unemployment durations. With the
threat point for the Nash bargained wage being a worker with zero unemployment
duration, the wage with ranking is much more sensitive to changes in the
tightness of the labor market. The same holds for efficiency wages.
Olivier Jean Blanchard Peter Diamond
Department of Economics Department of Economics
MIT MIT
50 Memorial Drive 50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139 Cambridge, MA 021391
This paper develops a model of the joint determination of unemployment, the
distribution of unemployment durations, and wages. The model is based on two
central assumptions. The first is that most vacancies receive multiple
applications. The second is that when firms receive multiple acceptable
applications, they hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount
of time. We refer to this second assumption as "ranking" and contrast it
throughout to the assumption of random hiring, or "no-ranking". We show that
these assumptions have a number of important implications. First, the exit rate
from unemployment is a decreasing function of duration, with the effect of
duration being stronger the higher the rate of unemployment. Second, the wage
depends on the distributions of prospective unemployment durations; one
implication is that long term unemployment, per Se, has little effect on wages.
Third, looking at the relation between the wage and the aggregate level of
unemployment, and comparing ranking to the case of no-ranking, the wage moves
less with the level of unemployment, but more with the change in unemployment.
We see those implications as consistent with stylized facts, consistent in
particular with characterizations of European unemployment in the 1980's.
We focus on ranking in the labor market as we see it as a relevant and
important characteristic of labor markets. A caveat is in order. We shall
discuss available empirical evidence below, when we have stated our assumptions
explicitly. But it is clear that firms do not rank only on the basis of
unemployment duration; that perceptions of differential quality among applicants
also affect hiring. To the extent that quality comes from matching skills and2
job needs, the hiring process will reflect both ranking and no-ranking elements,
so that ranking and no-ranking can be seen as the two polar cases. It is also
clear that ranking is not the only reason why the exit rate decreases with the
duration of unemployment. Composition effects are certainly at work, with the
most atcractive and qualified workers leaving the unemployment pool faster.
Duration dependence, either through loss of skills, or decreasing search
intensity also accounts for some of the decline in individual exit rates. Our
motivation for focusing on ranking to the exclusion of these other aspects is
the usual one, that it allows for a better understanding of the implications of
this assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I characterizes the matching
process and derives a matching function. A particularly convenient
characterization for our purposes is as an urn-ball process, with vacancies as
urns and applications by unemployed workers as balls. The distribution of
applications per vacancy depends on aggregate labor market conditions, thus on
aggregace unemployment and vacancies. Vacancies with at least one acceptable
application are filled. When a vacancy receives more than one acceptable
application, firms use a rule to choose among applicants. Under those
assumptions, the rule determines who is hired but does not affect the number of
hires.
Section II embodies the matching function derived in section I in a model of
the labor market. As in our previous papers, we formalize the labor market as a
market with continual job creation and destruction, and thus labor reallocation.
Having done so, we can characterize the equilibrium values of unemployment,
vacancies and hires.3
Section III derives the dynamics of the distributions of unemployment
durations and of exit rates. It characterizes steady state distributions, those
distributions which obtain when unemployment, vacancies, and hires are constant.
It shows how the exit rate depends on duration, and how this dependence is
itself a function of the State of the labor market. In a tight labor market, a
long term unemployed worker may be the only applicant at a given vacancy. In a
very depressed labor market, most vacancies receive many applications, so that
the probability of being hired decreases quickly with duration. -
SectionIV derives the behavior of wages. It does so under two assumptions.
The first is one of bilateral Nash bargaining between the selected applicant and
the hiring firm. The second is the impossibility of precommitment, or bonding,
so that workers can renegotiate once they have been hired. The implication is
that the wage depends on the labor market prospects of those who are employed,
were they to become unemployed, rather than on the prospects of the average
unemployed worker. Thus, for example, in a labor market which is depressed but
picking up, prospects for those becoming unemployed will be significantly better
than for those who have been unemployed for a while; in turn this will generate
substantial pressure on wages. Section IV focuses on the steady state relation
between unemployment and wages. Dynamics require simulations and this is done
in the next section.
Using a discrete time version of the model, section V presents dynamic
simulations of the joint behavior of unemployment, unemployment durations, exit
rates, and wages. It compares the behavior of wages under the assumptions of
ranking and no-ranking. The simulations show how, in the case of ranking,
anticipations of a decrease in unemployment have a strong effect on the wage
even in a currently depressed labor market.4
The qualitative nature of the results holds for other theories that have
wages depend on the market prospects of the employed workers. In particular,
this is shown in Section VI which repeats the analysis of sections IV and V for
an efficiency wage which satisfies a no-shirking condition.
Section VII discusses an implication and several issues in the model.
Section I. The matchine process
Our formalization of the matching process as an urn-ball process follows
Gerald gutters (1977) ar Robert Hall (1979). We present first a static
version, and then the continuous time extension which is used in the rest of the
paper.
1. A static urn-ball model.
Consider an economy with V vacancies and U unemployed workers. Firms which
want to fill a job post a vacancy. Think of the vacancies as urns. Each
worker makes one acceptable application with probability a, no application
otherwise; applications are submitted at random to one of the vacancies. The
parameter a captures in a very rough way a number of dimensions of the matching
process. It reflects the intensity of search by workers and firms, as well as
the skill and geographical distributions of workers and jobs. Think of the aU
applications as balls.
If the numbers of vacancies and applicants are large, the binomial
distribution giving the distribution of applications at a given vacancy can be
approximated by a Poisson distribution. The probability that a vacancy has noS
application is given by exp(-aU/V). Thus the number of aggregate hires, which
is equal to the number of vacancies which receive one or more applications, is
equal to:
(1) H —V(l-exp(.aU/V)).
This is the basic matching function of our model. In a more realistic
model, the application rate, a, would depend on the state of labor market;
workers are more likely to learn of vacancies when there are more of them. The
probability of making an acceptable application would also vary across workers,
according to both their characteristics and their unemployment durations. We
ignore those aspects here.6
2. A continuous time version.
While one can build a discrete time model in which hires are given each
period by equation (1), we prefer to work with a continuous time version of the
initial model. While the derivation of the iiiatching function is initially more
intricate, the payoff is the usual one of better tractability. The trusting
reader can go directly to equation (2) below.
Consider a model where vacancies are posted for one period, say a week. At
the end of the week, the application window is closed and the applications
generated by the vacancy are counted. If no applications have been received,
the vacancy is posted for another week. If one or more applications have been
received, the vacancy is filled1.
The week is divided in intervals of length 1/n. Vacancies are evenly
staggered, so that V/n vacancies start in each interval, each vacancy lasting
for a week. Applications are also evenly staggered over each interval. Let
be the number of applications during an interval of length 1/n; the relation of
An to U will be derived later. We assume that a worker can have only one
application pending at any time2.
We assume that the vacancy window is of fixed length, although thispolicy
is not generally optimal; a complicated time and state dependentstopping rule
which would be optimal in realistic settings is unlikely to addsufficiently to
the realism of the model to justify the analytical complexity.
2
To see the complexities being avoided, consider the case where workerscan
apply to many vacancies simultaneously. Upon hearing of their hiring by one
firm, workers would withdraw their other applications. Thus, instead of apure
birth process for applications, we would have to allow for a birth-death
process. With the ranking assumption, multiple applications would increase
duration dependence.The number of hires per interval is equal to the number of vacancies closing
with at least one application and is thus given by:
Hn —(V/n)(l-exp[-nA/V1).
In each interval, V/n application windows are closed. The term in brackets
gives the probability that the vacancy has received at least one application
while it was open and is therefore filled. At any time, there are V vacancies
open. Each of the A. applications in any given interval has an equal chance of
landing in each vacancy and each vacancy remains open for n intervals, i.e. ,one
week.
What remains to be determined is A. Let a'/n be the probability3 that an
unemployed worker with no application pending makes an application during any
interval of length 1/n. Let X be the pool of workers with applications pending.
Thus, applications are equal to a'/n times the pool of unemployed workers
without applications pending, U-X:
—(a'/n)(U-X).
Consider in turn the expression for X: only 1/n of the vacancies which were open
in the last interval have closed, so that a proportion (n-l)/n of the
applications made during the last interval is still pending. Of the
applications made 2 intervals ago, a proportion (n-2)/n is still pending, and so
on. This gives the expression for X:
The assumption that applications are made at rate a'/n per interval with a'
independent of n is inessential. What is essential is that, as we let n tend to
infinity, the rate of applications per interval of length 1/n converges to some
constant, say a", divided by n.8
X —((n-l)/n+(n-2)/n+.. .+l/n))A.
Solving for A and taking the limit as n goes to infinicy gives:
flAn —aU,
where
a —a'/(l+a'/2).
Replacing nA in the matching function, and noting that the flow per week is
Hn, gives:
(2) h —V(l-exp[-aiJ/V]),
where h is the instantaneous flow of hires. This matching function is the
Continuous time counterpart to equation (1) and holds when each vacancy is
opened for a discrete length of time, and vacancies are uniformly staggered.
For use below, note that, given the assumption that vacancies are posted for one
week, V stands for both the stock of vacancies and the flow of newly posted
vacancies at one point in time4.
We shall use equation (2) to study both steady state relations and dynamics.
Note however that, outside of steady state, the equation holds only as an
The assumption that vacancies last for one period (week) implicitly defines
the period. An alternative -butformally equivalent -formalizationstrategy
would be to have a basic period of fixed length, say a week, and have vacancies
last for 1/b weeks. Following the same steps as in the text gives:
h —bV(l-exp[-aU/bV]),where a —a'/(l+(a'/2b)).
Although we shall not do so in the paper, it is interesting to consider the
effects of varying b. As b becomes large, vacancies last for shorter and
shorter periods of time, reducing the probability of multiple applications. If,
in the case of multiple applications, firms use the length of unemployment as a
screening device, a lower probability of multiple applications increases the
likelihood of being hired for the long term unemployed.9
approximation. This is because ics derivation assumed that applications are
made at a constant rate during the week. Outside of steady state, applications
will not be constant within the week and equation (2) holds only as an
approximation. The approximation will be better the shorter the length of time
during which a vacancy is open and the smoother the change in application rates5
Below, we will use the Poisson distribution of applications per vacancy and
the implied matching function, (2), in a continuous time model. In doing so, we
will ignore other effects of the finiteness of the window. In particular, we
will ignore the possibility of bad productivity shocks while vacancy windows are
open. We will also ignore the implications of the finite windows for the time
shape of the probability of finding a job and for the discrete nature of the
time profile of filling a vacancy. That is, we shall use the finiteness of the
window only to derive the distribution of multiple applications, not recognizing
any other effects from the presence of windows.
Section II. A model of the labor market: flows and stocks
Having specified the matching process, we need to embed it in a model of the
labor market. We use the same minimalist model we have used in an earlier paper
This issue does not arise in the dynamic simulations presented in sections V
and VI. In those sections, the model simulated is a discrete time version of
the model with no overlapping vacancies.10
(1989), a model which captures the constant process of job creation and
destruction which characterizes labor markets6.
There are K jobs in the economy. To produce a revenue of y, a job must be
productive and filled with one worker. If either unproductive or/and unfilled,
itproduces0. Productivity for each job follows a Markov process in continuous
time. A productive job becomes unproductive with flow probabilityo An
unproductive job becomes productive with flow probability w1. At any point in
time, some jobs become productive, some jobs become unproductive. This is the
mechanism we use to capture the flows of job creation and job destruction that
exist in the economy.
Thus, at any point in time, some jobs are productive and filled, some are
productive but unfilled, in which case a vacancy is posted, and some are
unproductive and thus also unfilled. We denote the three stocks respectively by
E (as one job requires one worker, E is also employment), V (for vacancies), and
I (for idle capacity). From the definitions, K —E+V÷I.At any point in time,
some workers are employed, and some are unemployed. We denote those stocks by E
and U respectively. The labor force L—E+U is assumed fixed.
These assumptions imply that the behavior of the labor market is
characterized by a system of two differential equations:
dE(t)/dt —h(t)-,r0E(t),
(3)
6 The versionwe use here is stripped of details inessential for our current
purpose. In particular, we do not allow for quits and new entrants. The reader
is refered to our previous paper for a number of extensions.11
dV(t)/dt —-h(t)-r0V(t)+
where,from the previous section, hires are given by:
h(t) —V(t)(l-exp[-aU(t)/V(t)J).
The flow from employment to unemployment is equal to the flow of filled jobs
becoming unproductive. The flow from unemployment to employment is in turn
equal to hires. Hires depend on unemployment and vacancies through the matching
function derived earlier. Hires decrease the stock of vacancies. Vacancies
also decrease because some of the jobs for which vacancies were posted become
unproductive. Vacancies increase as previously unproductive jobs, idle
capacity, become potentially productive.
Using the two identities above, the dynamic system can be expressed solely
in terms of U and V:
dU(t)/dt —-h(t)+
(4) dV(t)/dt —•h(t)+,1(K-L-V(t)+U(t))-,r0V(t),
h(t) —V(t)(l.exp[.aU(t)/V(tfl).
Then, for given values of the two parameters iand wecan characterize the
dynamics and steady state values of unemployment and vacancies, as well as of
the flows of hires and separations.
It is convenient for later use to define the variable x by:
(5) x(t) —r0(L-U(t))/V(t).
It is equal to the ratio of separations to vacancies being closed at any point
in time. In steady state, separations are equal to hires so that x is equal to
the proportion of closing vacancies which are filled; it can therefore be taken
as an index of how tight or loose the labor market is. A smaller value of x is
a tighter labor market. Note that, in steady state, there is a simple relation
among x, U, and V, which will be useful below:12
x —h/V—(l-exp[-aU/V]),
or equivalently
(6) V/U —-a/log[l-x].
Note that at this point we have given a full characterization of the
behavior of unemployment and vacancies, and that it does not depend on the
particular rule used by firms to choose among applicants. In our model, hiring
rules do not affect how many are hired; but they determine who is hired, thus
affecting the distribution of unemployment, as well as wages. In terms of
conventional discussions of these issues, a of the framework developed in our
previous papers ((1989), Olivier Blanchard (1989)) hiring rules do not affect
the Beveridge curve but do affect the Phillips curve.
Section III. Ranking. unemDlovment duration and exit rates
We consider two hiring rules and derive their implications for the
distributions of unemployment durations and exit rates. Under the first, firms
do not rank applicants and choose randomly among them. Under the second, firms
rank applicants, choosing the worker with the smallest unemployment duration
first. We defer a discussion of the empirical evidence on hiring practices
until the end of the section, once we have shown the implications of ranking
rules.
We denote by U(8,t) the pool at time t of those with unemployment duration
less or equal to 8, so that U(8,t) is the (unnornialized) distribution of
unemployment.We denote its derivative with respect to duration, dU(9,t)/de,
by u(8,t), so that u(8,t) is the (unnormalized) density of unemployment with13
duration equal to 8 at time t. Finally, we denote by e(9,t) the exit rate from
unemployment at time t for those with duration equal to 9. When dealing with
steady states, we simplify notation, and denote those variables by U(8), u(8)
and e(8) respectively.
1. Durations and exit rates under no-ranking
If, when they receive multiple applications, firms choose randomly among
applicants, then all applicants have the same probability of being hired. Thus,
the exit rate, the probability of being hired, is independent of duration and
given by:
(7) e0(t) —h(t)/U(t),
where we shall use the index 0 to denote variables when firms choose randomly
among workers. U0(9,t) in turn satisfies:
(8) dU0(8,t)/dt —•u0(8,t)
-e0(t)U0(8,t)+x(t)V(t),
where x(t) was defined in (5).The change over time in the pool of unemployed
of duration less or equal to B is composed of three terms. The first two are
outflows. The first is the flow of those whose duration now exceeds 8. The
second is the flow of hires from the pooi. The third term is an inflow, the
flow of layoffs from employment.
In steady state, hires are equal to separations so that:
(9) e0 —h/U—xV/IJ—-ax/log[l-x],
using equation (6). The exit rate is a decreasing function of x. In steady
state the distribution of unemployment durations is unchanging through time, so
that, from (8):
u0(9) —-e0U0(8)+XV.14
Solving this differential equation in duration gives:
—1-exp[-e08],
or using equation (9)
(10) V0(9)/U —1-exp[axe/log[l-x]J.
2. Durations and exit rates under ranking
Suppose instead that, when firms receive multiple applications, they hire
the worker with the shortest spell of unemployment. Why firms do so in our
model is not specified. As all workers are identical, any rule is, for a given
firm, as good as any other, and no individual firmhasan incentive to change
its hiring rule. An alternative assumption, with equivalent implications, would
be that there is an arbitrarily small deterioration of skills with unemployment
duration, so that, while all workers are acceptable, the firmmarginallyprefers
those who have been unemployed the least time7. In a steady state, a similar
argument can be made from the presence of a small number of unemployables, who
are a larger fraction of the unemployed of longer duration. Whether firms
actually perceive large differences between unemployed workers of different
durations is a separate, empirical, issue that we discuss below.
In the case of ranking, the equation characterizing U(6,t) is given by:
(11) dU(8,t)/dt —-u(9,t)-V(t)(l-exp[-aU(6,t)/V(t)]) +x(t)V(t),
This argument implicitly assumes that all workers have to be paid the same
wage.But this is an implication of our assumptions about wage determination
below.15
The change in the pool of unemployed of duration less or equal to 8 at time t is
again composed of three terms. The first and third are the same as before. The
first is the flow of those whose durations now exceeds 8. The third is the flow
of layoffs. The second term is the flow of those who find a job and leave the
pool and is derived as follows. Consider a given vacancy. This vacancy will
result in a hire from the pool U(8,t) if there is at least one application from
a worker from that pool. The probability that there is at least one application
from a worker in the pool U(8,t) is equal to one minus the probability that
there is no application from that pool, thus equal to (l-exp[-aU(8,t)/V(tfl).
If V(t) is the flow of vacancies being closed at any point, the flow of hires
from U(8,t) is thus equal to V(t)(l-exp[-aIJ(e,t),'V(t)J).
The exit rate for a worker of duration 8 at time t is equal to the
probability that the worker applies, a, times the probability that the vacancy
applied for has no application from an unemployed worker with duration less than
8. Thus:
(12) e(8,t) —aexp[-aU(O,t)/V(t)).
In steady state, the pool of unemployed with duration less than or equal to
8 is constant, so that, from equation (11):
(13) u(8) —- V(l-exp[-aU(8)/V])+ XV.
Solvingthis differential equation in duration gives:
xexp[a(x-l)8)—(x-l)exp[aU(e)/VJ+ 1.
Solving for U(9) and using equation (6) gives the distribution of durations as a
function of x:
(14) U(8)/11 —1-(log[l-x.exp[-a(lx)eJ]/log(l_x]).
The exit rate is given in turn by:e(8) —aexp[-aU(8)/'fl.
Using (14) and (6) gives the exit rate as a function of x:
(15) e(9) —a(l-x)/(1-x.exp[.a(1-x)e1)
What are the implications of equation (15) for the behavior of exit rates?
First, and in contrast to the case of noranking, the exit rate is a decreasing
function of duration 8. For 8—0, the exit rate is equal to a: a worker who has
just become unemployed and applies to a vacancy is sure to be first and thus to
be hired. As 8 goes to infinity, the exit rate converges to a(l-x).
Second, the exit rate is a decreasing function of x, the state of the labor
market. From equation (15) and using l'Hospital's rule, as x tends to 1, that
is as the labor market becomes more depressed, the distribution of exit rates
tends to the limiting distribution:
e(8) •a/(1+ae)as x •1.
Third, the effect of unemployment duration on the exit rate is stronger the
more depressed the labor market. More precisely, 52log[e(8)]/886x is negative8.
The intuition for this result is simple. For low values of x, the ratio of
applications to vacancies is low: most vacancies receive zero or one application
and the long term unemployed stand nearly as good a chance of being hired as the
short term unemployed. The exit rate therefore decreases slowly with 8. As x
increases, the ratio of applications to vacancies increases, and with it the
8This is shown as follows: 621og(e(8))/886x has the samesignas exp[a(l-
x)8)(2x-l-a8x(l-xfl-x2. That expression is negative for x—0 and x—1, and does
not change sign between 0 and 1.fig 1
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likelihood of multiple applications. The long term unemployed are then much
less likely to be hired than the short term unemployed9.
Figure 1 plots U(s)/U and figure 2 plots e(8) for two values of x, x—0.l and
x—0.9. These extreme values show clearly the effects of ranking on exit rates
and duration distributions. In both a is taken to be 0.1. The value x—0.l
corresponds to a tight labor market. From equation (6), the ratio of
applications all to vacancies V is equal to 0.11. Most application windows are
closed without being filled, and very few generate multiple applications; the
proportion of vacancies which receive multiple applications is equal to 0.5%.
The probability of getting a job is high, no matter what length of unemployment
spell a worker has gone through. The exit rate is therefore high and declines
very slowly with unemployment duration.
The value x—0.9 corresponds to a depressed labor market, with a ratio of
applications to vacancies of 2.3. 90% of vacancies are filled when application
windows close, and 67% generate multiple applications. Thus the exit rate
declines rapidly with duration.
3. Evidence on hiring rules.
Having shown the implications of ranking rules, we now briefly turn to the
This implication may not hold in a model in which workers have quality
differences. The decline in the exit rate then reflects the deteriorating
composition of the pool, and the effect may be less drastic when unemployment is
high than when it is low. Put another way, being long term unemployed may be a
weaker correlate of bad quality when there are many long term unemployed.18
empirical evidence on hiring practices. The evidence comes from a number of
case studies, in particular a 1982 study for the US reported by John Barron and
John Bishop (1985), and a 1986 study for the UK by Nigel Meager and Hilary
Metcalf (1987)10.
Our assumption that ranking by duration is important is supported by three
sets of facts from those studies. First, many vacancies generate a large number
of applications, a necessary condition for our model to be of empirical
relevance (studies cited above, and Harry Holzer, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger
(1988)). Second, in many cases, the position is filled without interviewing all
applicants but by first creating a short list based on some simple criterion.
Third, "time since last job" is used both as a short listing criterion, and as
an important criterion in a final decision. Supportive evidence alo comes from
the perceptions of the employed workers: in the UK in 1985, while unemployment
stood at 11.6%, the proportion of employed workers who thought they could find a
job quickly if laid off stood at 45%, slightly higher than the 40% giving the
same answer in 1977 when unemployment stood at only 5.2% (Olivier Blanchard and
Lawrence summers (1988)).
However our specific assuption is stronger than simply saying that ranking
by unemployment duration is important. We assume that unemployment duration is
used as the only criterion in hiring. The empirical evidence shows clearly that
10 This last study isparticularly interesting given the depressed state of the
labor market in the UK and the high proportion of long term unemployed at that
time.19
this assumption is too strong. Leaving aside the fact that firms clearly take
into account the personal characteristics of workers -anaspect we have ignored
by assuming identical workers -unemploymentduration is not the only way in
which firms look at the employment history of workers. A criterion mentioned
more often than "time since last job" is "employment record". What this means
exactly is unclear; it may well be that a recent but short period of employment
may be discounted by firms. If the length of previous employment as well as the
duration of unemployment matter, the analysis becomes substantially more
complicated. More importantly, our qualitative results about wage determination
may be substantially affected. We shall return to this issue in the conclusion.
We also assume that, while firms use ranking by unemployment duration, they
see all workers as equivalent. As we indicated, the assumption can be relaxed
to allow for some duration dependence of skills, so long as all workers are
considered acceptable by firms. The evidence is that firms which rank by
unemployment duration perceive the long term unemployed as distinctly worse,
often as lacking motivation. Whether those firms would hire the long term
unemployed were they the only workers available is unclear from the available
evidence.20
Section IV. Waee determination under Nash baraainin
In characterizing wage determination, we make two assumptions. The first is
Nash bargaining between the newly hired worker and the firm. The second is that
workers cannot sign binding contracts11. This implies that, once an unemployed
-possibly a long term unemployed- worker is hired, she can renegotiate with the
firm, but now as an employed worker. This allows us to assume that the wage is
determined by Nash bargaining between the firm and each employed worker.
To see the importance of the second assumption, suppose instead that workers
signed binding contracts. Then, the surplus to a worker from a match would
depend on the length of her unemployment spell, and so would the wage under Nash
bargaining. Moreover, firms would prefer workers ready to accept lower wages,
thus upsetting any preferred hiring pattern over identical workers. The
presence of multiple applications would raise additional issues. When a firm
had multiple applications, and if the applicants could sign binding contracts,
the presence of two or more competing workers would yield the Bertrand rather
11 This issue arises also inefficiency wage models, and in insider/outsider
models, where it has been discussed at length. We have little to add to the
debate. We return to the issues raised by bonding and commitment in the
conclusion.21
than the Nash solution12.
We first characterize the wage under Nash bargaining and random choice of
workers by firms in hiring; this yields a familiar formula. We then
characterize the wage under Nash bargaining and ranking.
1. Wages under no-ranking.
Under random choice of applicants, the Nash bargaining solution takes a form
familiar from the earlier literature on search (e.g., Peter Diamond (1982)).
Let We(t) and W(t) be the values of being employed and unemployed respectively.
Let r, w(t), o and e(t) be the interest, wage, separation and exit rates.
Under no-ranking, the exit rate is the same for all unemployed workers and is
simply equal to e0(t) —h(t)/U(t).Assume that there is no flow of benefits
when unemployed. We(t) and W(t) satisfy the two arbitrage equations:
(16) r We(t) —w(t)+o(Wu(t)e(t)) +dwe(t)/dt,
(17) r V(t) — e0(t)(W(t)W(t))+dW(t)/dt.
Symmetrically, let Wf, W,,andW denote the values of a filled job, of a
vacant job, and of an idle job. Those values satisfy the three arbitrage
equations:
12 The assumption that the firm first choosesa worker among the applicants and
then bargains with that worker would give us Nash rather than Bertrand
bargaining, but, with binding contracts, the outcome would still depend on the
unemployment spell of the selected worker. We have not explored whether the
assumption that newly hired workers must be paid the same wage as the currently
employed can deliver results similar to those we derive under individual
bargaining.22
(18) r Wf(t) —y-w(t) +Ø(W(t)-Wf(t))+ dWf(t)/dt,
(19) r Wv(t) —(h(t)/V(t))(Wf(t)-WV(t))+,rO(Wi(t)WV(t))+dW(t)/dt,
(20) r Wi(c) — ri(W(t)-W(t))+dWj(t)/dt.
Productive and filled jobs bring a revenue to the firmofy-w(t). They may
however, with probability ir0, become unproductive, and thus idle. Vacant jobs
do not bring revenue and may either become filled, with probability h/V. or
unproductive and idle with probability w. Idle jobs in turn may become
potentially productive and thus vacant with probability i.
Under Nash- bargaining, the surplus from a match is split equally between the
worker and the firm so that:
(21) We(t) -W(t)—Wf(t)Wv(t).
We defer the examination of the dynamics to the next section and concentrate
on the steady state. In steady state all W's are constant, and the wage is
given by:
(22) w/y —(r+w0+e0)/(2r+2w0+e0+(h/V))
—(r+1r0+(h/tJ))/(2r+2,r0+(h/U)+(h/V)).
Using the fact that in steady state h/V—x and h/U —-axlog[l-x(from equation
(6)) gives the wage as a function of x, r and w0. Finally, if we assume that r
and are small in relation to both e0 and h/V. as is empirically the case,
then the wage reduces to:
v/yV/(V+U).
This gives the wage as a simple function of unemployment and vacancies.
2. Wages under ranking
How do things change if firms rank by unemployment duration, so that exit23
rates from unemployment depend on duration? The value of being unemployed now
depends on duration. Thus let W(8,t) be the value of being unemployed with
duration 9; and We(t), the value of being employed. The arbitrage equations
characterizing the behavior of W(e,t) and We(t) are then given by:
(23) r We(t) —w(t)+w(t)(Wu(O,t)We(t)) +dWe(t)/dt,
(24) r Wu(8,t) e($,t)(We(t)•Wu(8,t))+ dW(8,t)/de+ dW(e,t)/dt,
When an employed worker becomes unemployed, her unemployment duration is zero,
so that the change in value from becoming unemployed is now We(t)Wu(O,t). An
unemployed worker of duration 8 either finds a job with probability e(8,t)dt, or
becomes unemployed with duration 8+d8.
The arbitrage equations characterizing the values of filled, vacant and idle
jobs are the same as before.
As we argued earlier, in the absence of binding contracts, we can think of
the wage as the result of Nash bargaining between an employed worker and a firm.
If a deal is not struck, an employed worker stands to lose We(t)•Wu(O,t) as she
becomes an unemployed worker with zero length of unemployment spell; the firm
stands to lose Wf(t)Wv(t). The Nash bargain is characterized by:
(25) Ve(t) -W(O,t)—Wf(t)
-W(t).
In the rest of this section, we concentrate on the steady state. In steady
equation(24) becomes:
r Wu(9) —e(O)(WeWu(9))+dW(9)/d8.24
Integrating forward with respect to duration gives13:
e
W(0) —We5e(8)(exp(-f(e(z)+r]dz) d8.
0 0
Using this expression for W(0) in (25), and solving for the wage gives:
(26) w/y —
withe* implicitly defined by:
8
(27) e*/(e*+r) —5 e(8)exp[-f(e(z)s-r)dz] d8.
0 0
The formula characterizing the wage is thus the same as under random choice,
except for the presence of e* rather than e0. This however is an essential
difference and we explore it at more length.
How does the labor market situation now affect the wage? From the firm's
side, labor market tightness affects the wage through (h/V), which reflects how
long the firm expects to have to wait for another applicant, were the deal with
the current worker not to go through. From the worker's side, market tightness
affects the wage through the distribution of exit rates from unemployment. In
considering the threat point associated with an end to current employment, a
worker must consider reemployment possibilities in the future. Thus, what
matters for a worker is not the current unemployment rate, but the sequence of
exit rates she would face if she became unemployed. The effect of that sequence
13 The limit ofWu(8) as 8 grows without limit is found by noting that W(8) is
monotonically decreasing since e(8) is monotonically decreasing. Thus setting
the derivative equal to zero and substituting the limit value of e(8) gives the
limit value of W(8) in terms of We.25
is summarized by e*. e*/(e*+r) is a weighted sumofexit rates for durations 0
to ,withthe weights depending on the exit rate itself. If exit rates did not
decline with duration, e* would be equal to e0, the duration independent exit
rate with random hiring, and the expression for the wage would reduce to that
above.
The expression for e*/(e*+r) can be rewritten in terms of unemployment
duration densities, showing more clearly the effects of the composition of the
unemployment pooi in steady state. Differentiating equation (13), we have:
u'(8) —- aexp(-aU(8)/V]u(9) —- e(9)u(e).
Integrating with respect to duration, we have:
8
u(8) —u(0)expt-fe(z)dz].
0
Using this expression in equation (27) gives:
e*/(e*+r)_ 5e(8)(u(8)/u(0))exp[-r9]d8—.1 -u'(9)exp[-r9]/u(0)d8.
Integrating by parts, gives e* as a function of the sequence of u(e):
(28) e*/(e*+r) —1•r5u(8)exp[-r8]/u(0)de.
0
This expression shows how a change in the pattern of exit rates, with layoffs
and total unemployment unchanged, that shifted the distribution of durations
toward greater durations raises e*/(e*+r), and thus e* and w. Since the exit
rate with ranking is monotonically decreasing, crossing the no-ranking exit rate
once, this implies that the wage is higher with ranking than with no-ranking.
Finally, using the distribution of exit rates given in equation (15), e* can
be expressed as a function of x:Figure3.0
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(29) e*/(e*+r) —(l-x)x B ((r+a(l-x))/a(1-x),1),
where B is the incomplete Beta function,
x p-i q-l
B(p,q) —5 r (i-i) dr.
0
While not particularly revealing, this expression allows us to characterize the
effects of x on e* and thus on w.
Compared to random choice, how large a difference does ranking actually imply
for the steady State level of the wage at any level of unemployment, and for the
effect of changes in steady state unemployment on the wage? The answer depends
greatly on the interest rate. A positive value of r is, in steady state,the
onlyreason why the perspective of the employed workers differs from that of
those already unemployed. For conventional values of r, the difference between
the ranking and no-ranking wages is very small. This is shown in figure 3a,
which gives the ranking and no-ranking wages as a function of x, assuming that -
theprobability of an application is .1 per week, y is 1.0 and the annual
interest rate is 10% (the weekly interest rate is .2%). Even as x becomes close
to 1, as the labor market is more depressed, the ranking and no-ranking wages
remain close.
One may however argue that the relevant interest rate is higher, at least
for the workers if not for the firm14.Figure3b shows the effect of x onthe
wage for a value of the weekly interest rate of 1%. The effects of ranking on
14This argument however suggests using different interest rates for the firm
and for workers, something we have not done in the derivation.27
both the level of the ranking wage and its unemploymentelasticity become
clearer. The difference between the ranking and no-rankingwages increases as x
increases. The elasticity of the ranking wage with respect tounemployment
steadily decreases as x becomes close to one, as the labor market becomesmore
depressed. But itisclear from those figures that large steady state effects
from ranking alone require large discount rates, larger thanwe are willing to
assume.
Intuition suggests that the effects of ranking on the relation between
unemployment and wages may be more dramatic out of steady State. For example,
in a labor market which is depressed but pickingup, the prospects of the
currently employed, were they to become unemployed may be very different from
the current experience of those currently unemployed, leading tosubstantial
pressure on wages. Two effects are at work here. The first would be present
even under random hiring: higher hiring rates improve prospects for all
unemployed workers. But in addition, ranking improves prospects more for those
with short unemployment duration. The next section focuses ondynamics.
Section V. Dynamics of exit rates, durations and vases
Dynamics of aggregate unemployment, vacancies, separations, and hires are
characterized by equation (4), those of exit rates and durations by (7) and(8)
for the no-ranking case, and by (11) and (12) in the case ofranking. The
equations characterizing wage behavior are equations (16) to (21) for thecase
of no-ranking, equations (18) to (20), and (23) to (25) for thecase of ranking.
However, characterizing dynamics in the case of ranking is too hard an28
analytical task, and we turn now to simulations. Simulations are carried out
using a discrete time model; the details are given in Appendix A. We simply
note here that the simulation model is the discrete time version of the
continuous time model above except for the treatment of vacancies. The unit
period is a week. It is simpler to return to a specification with non
overlapping vacancies, as in the first part of section I, with all application
windows being open for one week at a time.
The parameters in the model are a, the probability that an unemployed worker
makes' an acceptable application during a week, w0 and which characterize the
process of job creation and destruction, the labor force, L, the capital stock,
K, and the interest rate, r. We choose parameters so as to -veryroughly-
replicate the characteristics of the US labor market. We shall focus on
movements between two steady states, one which corresponds to a depressed labor
market, the other to a normal labor market.
We choose, as a normalization, the labor force, L, to be 1. We choose K to
be 1.05. We choose the interest rate equal to .1% per week15. We choose a to
be 0.7: unemployed workers make 0.7 acceptable applications per week.
To choose the ,r parameters, we note -as in our previous papers- that, given
and wj, the proportion of productive jobs (filled or vacant) is equal to c •
andthat the proportion of jobs which go from being productive to
being unproductive is equal to a —01/(0-4-1). ccan be thought of as an
15 As is clear from our steady state results in the previous Section, the
choice of such an interest rate implies nearly no difference between steady
state ranking and no ranking wages.29
index of aggregate activity, s as an index of the intensity of reallocation. As
we are interested in cyclical fluctuations, we consider steady states which
differ in their value of c, but have the same value of s,
The first set of parameters, corresponding to a depressed labor market, is
—.019and r1 —.129, which in turn imply c—.872 and s—.0165. Together with
the values of a,L and K given above, these parameters imply Steady state values
for unemployment of .102, for vacancies of .018, and for x, the index of labor
market tightness we focused on earlier, of .94.
The second set of parameters, corresponding to a "normal" labor market, is
—.018and —.22,which imply c—.925 and s—.0l65. Together with the
values of a,L and K, these parameters imply steady state values for unemployment
of .05, for vacancies of .021, and for x of .80.
1. A sharp decrease in unemployment.
The first simulation shows the effects of a sharp decrease in unemployment
starting from a depressed labor market. In that simulation, the index of
aggregate activity, c, increases unexpectedly and permanently from .872 to
.925, with expectations adjusting at once to the permanent change. This leads
to a decrease in unemployment from an initial value of 10.2% to a new steady
state value of 5.0%. The speed at which unemployment decreases exceeds that
found in actual economies; the reason for presenting this simulation is that the
sharp and rapid decline in unemployment shows most clearly the mechanisms at
work.
Figure 4.a presents the path of adjustment of unemployment and vacancies.
Time is measured in weeks on the horizontal axis. Unemployment adjustsFigure 4.0
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monotonically to its lower value, with the adjustment being largely over after 4
months, Vacancies increase from 1.8% to 2.1%, overshooting their steady State
value for some time. This is because the number of job creations, thus of newly
posted vacancies is larger at the beginning, when activity picks up, than when
the economy nears steady state.
Figure 4.b gives unemployment densities by duration at various points in the
adjustment process. The final steady state distribution shows lower density at
all durations than the initial distribution, reflecting the tighter labor market
situation. Note that, during the process of adjustment, densities at low
duration decrease to values lower than their steady state values. This is
because the large initial increase in job creations and thus newly posted
vacancies leads to large hiring rates, and thus to rapid attrition of those
cohorts entering unemployment after the pickup in economic activity and hiring.
This is confirmed in figure 4.c which gives exit rates by duration, again at
various points in the adjustment process. In the final steady state, exit rates
are much higher than in the initial steady state, especially at long durations.
And exit rates, 4 and 8 weeks after the change in c, substantially exceed their
steady state values.
Finally, figure 4.d gives the behavior of wages. Eoth the ranking and the
no-ranking wages increase substantially in anticipation of higher exit rates in
the future. The effect on the ranking wage is substantially stronger. It more
than doubles, overshooting its steady state value and then slowly decreasing
over time. This shows most clearly the effects of ranking. Although the market
is still initially depressed, the prospects of the employed workers are so good
as to increase the wage above its steady state value.Figure
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2. A slower decline in unemployment.
The second simulation considers the same decrease in unemployment, butat a
slower pace. In that simulation, c follows the partial adjustmentprocess c(t)-
c(t-l) —.O2(.926-c(t-l)),starting from an initial value of .872. The change
from the initial value is unanticipated, but from then on the path ofadjustment
of c is fully anticipated by workers and firms.
Figure 5.a shows the adjustment of unemployment and vacancies over the first
two years. The process of adjustment comes now from the convolution of the
process for c and the intrinsic dynamics of the system. The process of
adjustment is monotonic for both vacancies and unemployment, and is mostly
complete after two years.
Figures 5.b and S.c show the evolution of unemployment densities and exit
rates. There is no longer overshooting of either exit rates or densities.
Figure S.d shows the behavior of wages. Despite the fact that the
adjustment of unemployment is now much slower, the contrast between the ranking
and the no-ranking wages is still dramatic. While the rankingwage no longer
overshoots its steady state value, it increases by a large amount when the labor
market picks up, substantially more than the no-rankingwage.
Section VI. Efficiency Wages
We have analyzed the labor market under the assumption that thewage is set
to divide the gain from beginning employment between a firm and a newly laid-off
worker,32
We -Wu(O)—Wf
-
WV.
An alternative assumption, is that wages are set by firms, rather than bargained
over. The determinants of the optimal wage include the need to attract workers
more quickly, to attract better workers, to hold workers, and to encourage
workers to work more efficiently. One particularly simple version of this array
of effects is the case where wages are set to just aatisfy an equality between
the cost of losing a job and a constant. This condition has been interpreted as
a no-shirking condition (Cuillermo Calvo (1979), Carl Shapiro and Joseph
Sciglitz(1984)). If a fired worker is in the same position as a newly laid-off
worker, this condition becomes:
(30) W -Wu(O)
—-0.
This condition can only hold where the gain to hiring a worker remains positive.
When the condition holds, no one is ever fired, and the dynamics of unemployment
(and, we assume, vacancies) is the same as that modeled above. Thus, the
presence of duration dependent (rather than random) hiring rules affects the
wage. The equations for the values of different positions of workers in terms
of the wage are unchanged. Using (30) to determine the wage and solving, we
have:
(31) w —(r+wo+e*)0.
Similarly, it is straightforward to simulate the economy, using this
alternative wage determination equation and following the same discrete time
formulation as was used above and is described in Appendix A.Figures 6 and 7
show the response to the same sudden and slow increases in c which were
discussed above. For these simulations the parameter 0 was chosen so that the
wage with ranking would be the same before the change with efficiency and Nash0
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bargained wages. These figures give the same qualitative picture as those
above.
It is natural to ask what happens if we combine Nash and efficiency
arguments about the determination of wages. That is, how are wages determined
if the firmandthe worker are free to bargain over the wage, but itisknown
thatthe worker will shirk if the wage is below the level needed for the no-
shirking condition. As we argue in Appendix B, the wage is the maximum of the
wages set by the two conditions. Thus, the no-shirking condition results in the
higher of two wage levels, just as is the case with an outside option (Kenneth
Binmore (1983) and Avner Shaked and John Sutton (1984)).
Section VII. Conclusions
Rather than repeat our results, we take up one implication of our results
for microeconomic work on unemployment, and discuss two issues in our basic
model.
It is a common practice to make comparative static inferences from observed
exit rates of the unemployed, using the exit rates as contributions to hiring.
The model of this paper points to the dangers of doing so. (On the same issue,
in a different model, see Bo Axell and Harald Lang (1988).) Consider first the
random hiring model. In this model, all workers have the same exit rates. Yet
this exit rate is not equal to the marginal contribution of a worker to
aggregate hiring. With a constant returns aggregate matching function, the
marginal product of a worker will be less than her average product. Consider
next the ranking model. In this model all workers have exactly the same34
marginal contributions to aggregate hiring, but workers differ aignificantly in
their exit rates. Thus two economies with the same numbers of vacancies and
unemployed but different ranking rulea, and so different distributions of
durations, would have the same aggregate hires. Consider finally an extension
of the ranking model where the acceptable application rate, a, varies with
duration. For example, assume that long duration unemployed, knowing they have
little chance of finding jobs are more diligent in finding vacancies to which to
apply. (Empirical evidence points to the opposite behavior, but we are not
making an empirical point here.) If the application rate rises sufficiently
slowly with duration, the exit rate could decline with duration while the
marginal contribution to aggregate hires is rising with duration. These
examples underline the importance of an articulated equilibrium model when
considering the effects of policies such as changes in the schedule of
unemployment benefits.
Our results are based on the assumptions that there is no deterioration of
skills with unemployment duration and that workers cannot sign binding
contracts. How are the results likely to be modified when we relax one or both
assumptions? If we allow for -evenpartial -commitmentbut maintain the
assumption of identical workers, the only equilibrium is one with random hiring.
The reason is simple: if other firms rank by unemployment duration, an
individual firm has an incentive to hire those who have been unemployed for the
longest time, as they will accept a lower compensation. Ranking cannot
therefore be an equilibrium. If instead, we do not allow for commitment, but
allow for duration dependence, so that,- for example, the training cost of a new
worker increases with unemployment duration, then, our model still applies, with35
the modification that those with very long unemployment durationmay require too
large a training cost and so may no longer be employable. In contrast to the
version in the text however, firms are no longer indifferent withrespect to the
hiring rule, but now have an incentive to rank applicants and choose those with
the shortest duration first. This implies that, if we allow for bothcommitment
and duration dependence, the ranking rule we have used will still bean
equilibrium when the training cost minus the bond that firms extract from
workers in equilibrium increases with duration. In a companionpaper, (1990b),
we are exploring equilibrium with training costs and commitment.
We also speculate that similar considerations are at work if-asempirical
evidence suggests is the case -firmscare not only about unemployment duration,
but also about the employment record. Suppose for example that firmsrank
workers by unemployment duration, subject however to the constraint that
employment duration in the previous job exceeds some minimum length. In this
case, itisclear that firms will be able in effect to extract a bond from the
worker, with the size of the bond being a function of the length ofemployment
required to acquire a badge of good behavior. A question is then when, with
duration dependence, ranking is still an equilibrium.36
Aoendix
The model used for simulations is a discrete time version of the model in
the text, except for the treatment of the timing of vacancies. It is simpler in
discrete time to shift back to a model without overlapping application windows.
Our basic period for the simulations is a week. We start the week with E(t-
1) filled jobs, U(t-l) unemployed, V(t-l)vacancies, and K-V(t-l)-E(t-l) in idle
capacity. From Monday to Friday, the employed workers produce, the unemployed
make job applications, and vacancies receive job applications. On Saturday,
there are wo and w1 shocks that change the productivity of some of the jobs. On
Sunday, some workers are laid off while others get new jobs. On Monday, the
wage is agreed to for the coming week and work begins. The aggregate shocks we
consider in simulations are changes in the values or the paths of and w1.
These changes occur on Saturday.
By normalization of the labor force,
(Al) E(t) +tJ(t)—1.
The hiring function is equation (1) in the text. Vacancies shrink from new
hires and from idling while they grow from positive shocks to idle capacity:
(A2) V(t)—V(t-l)*exp[a*tJ(tl)/V(t-l)]*(l-w0)+w1*(KE(tl)V(t.l)).
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that newly hired workers who are
idled at the end of the week do not get another crack at a job this week.
The newly unemployed, U(O,t), were laid off at the end of week t-l. Their
numbers satisfy:
(A3) U(O,t) —w0E(t-l).37
We denote by U(t,9) the numbers of unemployed who were laid off less than9+1
full weeks ago. We track9 on a weekly basis from 0 to 51 and denotetotal
unemployed by U(t). We assume that the ranking model holds for durationsup to
one year, but all unemployed with durations over a year have the same job
finding probabilities, We need to track the unemployment duration equations for
the weeks up to one year and for total unemployment. For 8 —1to 52, the
unemployed up to any duration are the unemployed up to a duration one week less
one week ago, plus the newly laid off minus the new hires that survive the bad
productivity shock within the week:
(A4) for 8—1to51,
U(e.t) —U(8-1,t.l)+U(0,t)
V(t.l)*(1.exp[.a*U(8.l,t..l)/V(t.l)])*(l_w0);
(A5) U(t) —U(t-l)+U(O,t)
V(t.l)*(l.exp[.a*U(t_1)/V(t_1)])*(1_w0)
We now have a recursive system which will track vacancies andunemployment
of different durations. Associated with those values of unemployment and
vacancies are the exit rates (under ranking):
(A6) e0(O,t+1)—
and for 9—1 to 52,
e(8,t+l)— V(t)*(exp[.aU(9.1,t)/V(t)]
It is convenient to define f(t+1) as h(t+1)/V(t):
f(t+l)—(1-exp[..aU(t)/V(t)] )*(lo)
Next, we derive the equations for the Nash bargained wage. The value functions
for the different positions for a firm satisfy:
Wf(t-1) —y-w(t-l)+
(A7) W(t_l) — S(?OWi(t)+f(t)Wf(t)+(l0f(t))W(t));38
W(t-1) — 6((l.rj)W(t)+
Definethe value from filling a job as
(A8) tf(t)
—Wf(t)
-Wv(t)•
Subtracting the first two equations in (A7), we have:
(A9) f(t-l) —y-w(t-l)+6(l-w0-f(t))f(t).
The value functions for the workers recognize the constant probability of
job finding for all workers with duration over one year.
(AlO) We(tl) —w(t-l)+6(PoWo(t)+(PO)We(t)
and for 8 —0to 51,
W(8,t-l) —6(e(8,t)We(t) +(l-e(8,t))W(e+l,tfl;
Wu(S2,tl) —8(e(52,t)W5(t)+(l-e(52,t))W(52,tfl.
imilarly, we define the gain from finding a job after different unemployment
durations:
(All) for 8 —0to 52,(8,t) —We(t)
-W(8,t).
Subtracting the equations in (AlO) and using the gains, (All), we have:
(Al2) for 8 —0to 51,
(9,t-l) —w(t-l)+6((l-e(8,t))t(9-s-l,t)-w0(0,t));
(52,t-l)—w(t-l) +6((1-e(52,t))(52t)-ff0(O,t)}.
Subtracting the 0 equation from the rest, we can write:
(A13) for e—1to51,
(8,t-l) —t(t-1,O)+6((l-e(9,t))t(8+l,t)-(1-e(O,t))E(t,l))
(52,t-l)—(t-1,O)+6((l-e(52,t))(52,t)-(1-e(0,t))(t,1)).
The generalized Nash bargaining solution relates the loss from becoming
newly unemployed to the loss from becoming a vacancy:
(A14) (O,t)_We(t)Wu(O,t)_Z(Wf(t)Wv(tfl Zf(t).39
(We have implicitly taken z to be 1 in the text. We do the same in the
simulations we report in section 5.) Combining this with the equations for the
gains we have:
(Al5) 5(O.t-l)+f(t-l) —(l+l/z)(O,t-l)—(l+Z)f(t-l)
—y+(lwOf(t))f(t)+(le(O,t))(l,t).,rOA(Ot))
Thus, we have a set of 54 forward looking value equations. Starting at the
steady state value equations, the equations can be run backwards using the
escape rates along the transition path and starting far enough in the future
that the value equations are indistinguishable from the final steady state.
From this trajectory of values of j,thewage can be calculated. In
particular, we use the equation:
(Al6) (l+z)w(t-l)—zy.i-6((l-f(t))(o,t)(l.e(o,t))(1,t)).
To calculate the steady state values for starting this calculation, we use
the equations:
(Al7) 6(l-e(O))(l) —- y+
(A18) for 9 —Ito 52, A(9) —
wherea(9) satisfies (52) —
andfor 9 —1to 51, a(8) —1+5(l-e(9))a(9+l).
The first two equations solve simply for and and can be used to solve the
remaining steady state values.
For comparison purposes, we also want to calculate the wage assuming random
hiring. The trajectories of U and V are unaffected. e(t+l) and f(t+l) now
satisfy:
(A19) e(t+l) —V(t)*(lexp(aU(t)/V(t)))*(l_,r0)/U(t);
f(t+l) — (l-exp[.aU(t)/V(t)])*(l-w0).40
The value equations for the firmcontinueto satisfy (A9). For the worker, we
have:
(A20) We(tl) —w(tl)+8(lrowu(t)+(l-lro)We(t));
W(t-l) — {e(t)We(t)+(l.e(t))Wu(t)).
Subtracting,
(A2l) e(t) —We(t•l)
-W(tl)
—w(t-l)+
Sincethe Nash bargaining solution, (A14), still holds, we have:
(A22) e(t)+f(t) —(l+l/Z)te(tl)
—(l+z)f(t-l)
—y+
As before, the simulation is done by calculating values backwards from a steady
state.
We also derive the wage under efficiency wazes. To simulate efficiency
wages, we continue to use (A13). Instead of (Al5), we use the no-shirking
condition:
(A23) (0,t) —C.
Thus we have 52 forward looking equations which can be solved backwards from the
steady state. The wage can then be solved from any equation in (A12) and the
nonnegativity of the value of hiring a worker checked from solving (A9)
backwards, To calculate the steady state values, we use (A23) along with (A18),
which continues to hold. For the firm, we use the steady state version of (A9).
Appendix B: Combining Nash and Efficiency Wage Theories
In the text we have considered separately the situations where the wage
satisfies the Nash bargaining solution and where the wage satisfies a no-41
shirking condition. In this appendix, we argue that the presence of both
bargaining and the need to motivate workers results in a wage which is the
maximum of the wages generated under the two hypotheses. In a nonstationary
environment, the equilibrium wage would be based on looking ahead, where in each
future period the wage would be the maximum of the two approaches. This is
similar to the argument that has been made by Kenneth Binmore (1983) and AvTIer
Shaked and John Sutton (1984) when an outside option is available.
This result can be seen from both the axiomatic formulation of the Nash wage
and the noncooperative bargaining approach. The equation used above for the
Nash wage comes from selecting a wage to maximize the product of the gains from
beginning employment for the firm and the worker. Consider what happens if it
is known that the worker will shirk (do no work) if the wage is below some
critical level. In this case the gain to the firm from hiring the worker is
negative. Thus any wage that violates the no-shirking condition does not
maximize the product. If the Nash wage is above the critical value, it does
maximize the value. If the Nash wage is below the critical value then the
efficiency wage maximizes the product since, ignoring shirking, the product is
quasiconcave in the wage.
We proceed by describing a bargaining game. Assume that the firm moves
first, proposing a wage, w1. The worker has three options: accept the wage and
do not shirk, accept the wage and shirk, reject the wage. If the worker rejects
the wage, the worker proposes the next wage, w2. The firm might accept or
reject this wage. If the firm accepts the wage, the worker then gets to choose
whether to shirk or not. If the firm rejects the wage, the firm gets to make
the next proposal. At any time there is a probability that negotiations will be42
exogenously broken off, requiring each party to wait for the next potential
partner with whom to take up negotiations. The value of the position in the
event of broken negotiations is the status quo point for the Nash solution.
The last move in any sequence which results in a contract is for the worker
to decide whether or not to shirk. This decision is made by comparing the wage
with the wage coming from the no-shirking condition. This makes it clear that
the firm will never offer a wage that is accepted which is below the efficiency
wage, and that the value of a contract to the firm and worker is based on
production without shirking. We assume that a contract at the no-shirking wage
is preferable to the firm to having no contract. The heart of the argument is
that if the Nash wage exceeds the efficiency wage, it remains the solution to
the bargaining game; if the Nash wage is not above the efficiency wage, there is
no internal solution to the bargaining problem, and the efficiency wage is -
offeredand accepted at the first stage.
Since this is a stationary game, we can follow the procedure in Avner Shaked
and John Sutton (1984), where the parties understand that the game at step three
has the same value as the game at step one. Let K be the value to the worker of
being at step 3. At step 3 the value to the firm is V-K, where W is the
combined value to the firm and worker from an agreement which results in work
without shirking (a value which is independent of the wage). At step 2, waiting
until step 3 is worth (pW+(1-p)(W-K)) to the firm, where p is the probability
of an exogenous breakdown in negotiations and W, the value of being a vacancy.
Thus at step 2, the worker's position is worth W-(pW+(1-p)(WK)}. This is more
than the value which ensures no-shirking. Seen from step 1, waiting until step
2 is worth pWu+(lp)(W(pWv+(lp)(WKfl) to the worker. The firm will make this43
offer, unless it is less than the efficiency wage, in which case the firm offers
the efficiency wage. Setting the value of the offer to the worker at step 1
equal to K, we have
As p goes to zero, this is the familiar formula for We.44
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